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THE INDIVIDUAL, POWERS AND THE IDEA OF 
PUNISHMENT IN ARISTOTLE 
di Virginia M. Giouli 
 
Abstract: Aristotle cherishes the idea of social equity despite his deep respect for social diversity 
and social difference. The end justifies the means as long as we aim to achieve equity and virtue, 
according to Aristotle. Equity thus determines and rectifies penal justice. Devotion to the ideal of penal 
justice annuls any relativism in our public experiences of the institutional sanctions that safeguard 
democracy. However, Aristotle considers a valid system of penal justice as unattainable, believing, as he 
does, that one cannot ever know whether punishment is socially efficacious. If we think logically, we may 
see that Aristotle believes that power is inherently weak. Unfortunately, however wide the field of 
doubts facing us, Aristotle’s material reductionism is traced simply because it is the content of our 
experience, a reductionist one. Nevertheless, his dismissal of the motives of revenge and utility as 
nonsensical re-establishes the institutional character of punishment in order to humanise it. Punishment 
is no longer considered to be a symbol of state-oppression and becomes a symbol of law the fulfillment 
of which is wisdom without desire for uncontrolled power 
Keywords: Equity, penal justice, punishment, Aristotele. 
 
Title: L’individuo, le forme di potere e l’idea di punizione in Aristotele 
Riassunto 
Aristotele ha a cuore l'idea dell'equità sociale nonostante il suo profondo rispetto per la diversità 
sociale e delle differenze. Secondo Aristotele, il fine giustifica i mezzi fintanto che si mira all'equità e alla 
virtù. L'equità determina e giustifica così la giustizia penale. La devozione all'ideale della giustizia penale 
annulla qualsiasi relativismo nelle nostre esperienze pubbliche delle sanzioni istituzionali che 
salvaguardano la democrazia. Tuttavia, Aristotele considera un valido sistema di giustizia penale 
irraggiungibile, ritenendo, come lui, che non si può mai sapere se la punizione sia socialmente efficace. 















































































debole. Purtroppo, per quanto ampio sia il campo dei dubbi che abbiamo di fronte, il riduzionismo 
materiale di Aristotele è tracciato semplicemente perché è il contenuto della nostra esperienza, un 
riduzionismo. Ciononostante, la sua esclusione dei motivi di vendetta e di utilità come nonsenso 
ristabilisce il carattere istituzionale della punizione per umanizzarla. La punizione non è più considerata 
un simbolo dell'oppressione dello Stato e diventa un simbolo della legge il cui compimento è la saggezza 
senza desiderio di potere incontrollato. 
Parole chiave: Equità, Giustizia penale, Punizione, Aristotele. 
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1.  Aristotle, Castoriadis says,1 wrote The Constitution of the Athenians, not the Constitution of 
Athens. Aristotle here uses Thucydides‘ “ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις” (for the city is the men). This alludes to the 
way people go about common affairs under a given political constitution. According to Aristotle, 
Castoriadis rightly claims,2 only the political institutions of society holding explicit power can formulate 
penal sanctions. If all such sanctions wither away in society, we may infer from Popper,3 if each 
member of a community is not required to exercise personal responsibility for the realisation of the a 
functional society controlled by penal sanctions, there begins the suppression of reason and truth in 
history and a return to the state of mere beasts. Nature does not know norms. The introduction of 
norms, of institutional sanctions against the violators of legislation, are thus what has raised men 
above beasts. True, we would have expected Aristotle to have preferred a biological model of social 
and political development. Aristotle, indeed, invokes at the same time nature and reason in order to 
justify penal sanctions as prerequisites for democracy. But the term nature, in Metaphysics 1015 a14, 
lacks the modern scientific sense and suggests the essence, the purpose of social and political 
institutions in their order.4 We may again infer from Castoriadis5 that any mention of natural law would 
be self-contradictory in Aristotle’s Works. No human being can be considered worthy unless s/he is a 
 
* Acknowledgements. I would like to mention with gratitude Professor Ronald Dworkin, a philosopher and jurist 
(University of Oxford and New York University) who showed great interest in my connecting of his ideas on 
liberalism with theories of cultural support, in various papers and monographs of mine. I had intended to seek a 
meeting with him to discuss these ideas. Alas, his death in 2013 frustrated these plans. I also wish to express my 
gratitude to Professor John Cottingham (University of Reading) whose interest in the philosophy of punishment has 
been highly valuable for me. In the light of his criticism, I have tried to clarify various problems in it. Again, I 
express my gratitude to Professor David Charles (Oriel College, Oxford and Yale University). Having commented 
on my viewpoint on Aristotle’s Non-Realistic Account of the World in a letter of his (18th March 2013), he stated 
that my differing account constitutes an interesting challenge to the type of position he outlines in the final chapter 
of his Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Clarendon Press, 2000). 
1 Cf. Castoriadis, Philosophy, 109; cf. Also Virginia M. Giouli, Psychoanalysis, 83-106. 
2 Cf. Castoriadis, Philosophy, 156. 
3 Cf. K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies I, 200-201. 
4 Cf. Castoriadis, Philosophy, 130. 
















































































member of a worthy city, i.e., a city ruled by the proper laws. The discovery of the arbitrariness of the 
institutional penal sanctions6 by means of which the ruled may control the power of the rulers opens 
up the interminable discussion about right, wrong, justice and the correct type of Constitution. If we 
allow7 for such requirements of law to be permanently open to criticism and to continue producing 
evidence for their truth or fallibility, we have al-ready seen, this is not even logically tenable. Moreover, 
they are not morally tenable. Again, we do not propose any unifying goal of morality to determine such 
conclusive remarks. But this does not imply any relativism8 in our viewpoint of legal procedures. We 
only stress the ways in which morality is not so closely linked to rationality, i.e. the ways in which 
morality is intrinsically consistent in avoiding moral justifications of legal practices in one’s conception 
of the good life, and the absence of this justific-ation in another conception of it.9 This has nothing to 
do with the eagerness to elim-inate errors and immoral attitudes in social and legal life and reality in 
general.  
We must admit that we are never fully capable of laying claim to social or penal truth, i.e. to what lies 
beyond the fringes of everyday experience. Aristotle’s formula of the material world, its substance, its 
entelechy, does not guarantee its very identity. What is at stake regards the foundational, the 
necessary terms of life and social reality; and not the logically impossible, the unknown nature of social 
truth. What is left therefore for the human: to examine her/his identity and the total of her/his social 
relations? The answers on offer in Aristotle’s texts concern primarily this struggle for responses in the 
realm of experience, in the world of material objects, in the world of the contin-gent. The distance 
between the two realms is indeed vast. We refer to the realm of everyday experiencing of legal 
practices as being distant from the realm of possibilities. These possibilities can be opened up by our 
adoption of a system of reference, passionate interpretation and our dedication to the unknown, the 
logically impossible.  
 
2.  Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, (1095 a ff) is very reluctant10 to admit that ethics could be a 
science.11 But this does not mean that he espouses relativism. Commitment to ethical objectivity 
should not be confused with commitment to ethical or moral authoritarianism. The virtous man in 
Aristotle’s scheme has to test her/his conduct to see if it is in accordance with the right rule. In 
Nicomachea Ethics, I-II, VI, it is stated that the determination of what constitutes right rule is to be 
made in the light of an overall, rationally ordered conception of the Good Life .12 It is the job of what 
Aristotle calls the man of practical wisdom to use her/his rational powers to work out an overall 
conception of this life. Aristotle thus espouses the ethical basis of rationalism, since rationality and 
morality are thus essentially linked. He recognises in Politics, 1301 b29, that different ideas of this life, 
different conceptions of how to live might be appropriate for different persons on account of the 
different political Constitution under which they are living. But he argues in Rhetoric, 1368 a, 1373 b4, 
in Nicomachean Ethics, 1162 b21, 1180 b, 1134 b and in Politics, 1319 b, that ideally there is some sort 
 
6 Cf. Giouli, “The Culture of Non-Punishment.” Cf. N. Courakis, “Financial Crime Today,” 197-219. 
7 Cf. Virginia M. Giouli, An Aristotelian Critique, 44-45. 
8 Cf. Harré, “Persons and Powers.” 
9 Cf. Virginia M. Giouli, “Language and Morals,” esp. 127 and nn. 9-10. 
10 Cf. Charles and Scott, “Aristotle.” 
11 Cf. Putnam, Reason, 135, 148-149. 















































































of Constitution suitable for all. Aristotle cherishes the idea of social equity despite his respect for social 
diversity and social difference. The end justifies the means as long as we accomplish equity and virtue, 
he maintains in Nicomachean Ethics, 1106 b7, 1107 a5. Equity thus determines and rectifies penal 
justice, we may infer from Nicomachean Ethics, 1137 b8-12. Devotion to such an idea of penal justice 
avoids any relativism as regards the institutional sanctions that safeguard democracy.13 The supreme 
social institution of punishment14 can be envisaged as a prerequisite for democracy. This means that 
we emphasise the distance between what we can do in legal science and what we must have done. 
We shall never fully adopt the values of justice and freedom.  But, at the same time, we shall never 
cease our unsuccessful struggle towards the above. Our devotion to the realm of the unknown, the 
logically impossible, neither contradicts nor is contradicted by our legal statements; nor does it support 
nor oppose it. This commitment brings the relevance of our experience into our practice which is self-
correcting and activates our scientific knowledge of law and society.15 Our interpretation of law 
activates viewpoints regarding propositions of legal truth and fallibility. I now recall Socrates’ example 
regarding his obedience to bad law. We hold here a sceptic’s reservation. In the absence of an external 
point of view we can only resort to our moral convictions or substantive claims. But is thus normativism 
unavoidable?16 And does it concern Aristotle’s weak metaphysics?17 We question not only Aristotle’s 
attack on reductionism but also his embracing of the idea that sensory data undermine such viewpoints 
which the legal proposition conveys. The interpretational is thus normative and it can undermine 
scientific knowledge of social facts. Social utility indeed can be said to be determined by the ideal of 
justice. But this is totally unsuccessful. Justice in this sense, Aristotle states, (V, 1, 1129 b30-35) is 
complete virtue in the fullest sense.18 Justice is, he adds, the active exercise of absolute virtue. And 
this is absolute, Aristotle states, because its possessor can exercise it in relation to another person and 
not only to herself/himself. So here we investigate the legal evidence which we have produced and 
also the legal phenomena which we have established. This presupposes that we have adopted that 
range of concepts which seeks legal truth as residing in the realm of the unknown, as an ideal waiting 
to be realised; since we vulnerable humans must always consider alternative explanations logically 
possible.19 And as Nussbaum adds at this point, Aristotle does not regard the evident riskiness and 
instability of such legal values and truth in the world as a reason to rule them out of the best life by 
fiat, or to conclude, against common intuition that the person who loses them has lost nothing serious. 
Instead, Aristotle views the concomitant facts about politics and society as giving a reason for 
competent and serious people to turn their attention to legislation and political plan-ning. The 
perception of norms is absent here. But our faithfulness in uncovering them remains intact. This does 
not mean that we can entirely adopt virtue or justice; or that the interpretational belongs entirely in 
the realm of the logically possible. It only means that we shall never cease our efforts to realise such 
an ideal of justice. We cannot realise this outside the conditions in which we can meaningfully attempt 
this realisation. There is always in Aristotle, as there is in Hegel, a time when contradiction is sharper 
on a different level,20 in a different way i.e., one that claims a membership of the body of universalia 
 
13 Cf. Virginia M. Giouli, “Wittgenstein.” Moutsopoulos, “Equity.” 
14 Cf. Virginia M. Giouli, An Aristotelian Critique, 57-73; also her Punishment, 28. 
15 Cf. N. Courakis, “Ethnopsychology,” 391-414; also Giouli, “Relativity.” 
16 Cf. Rodriguez-Blanco,” Jurisprudence Revisited.” 
 
18 Cf. Nussbaum, Fragility, 351-352. 
19 Cf. N. Courakis, “Criminal Law,” 3-13. 
















































































(I, 3, 270 b5-20).21 For Hegel, however, there is an internal momentum, a dynamic of change in the 
order of historical events. Laws are inherent in this order and they can highlight contradictory 
situations, which are unstable due to change. Aristotle believes this to be highly unlikely. Laws are here 
given ab extra, and however hard we may strive to initiate change and, thus, understand contradiction, 
we are only liable to fall into the error of erroneously wandering to another kind of event in social life 
and reality in general. All these experiences in Aristotle are challenged by the unknown realm of values. 
But this can only hinder our vulnerable and weak nature from ever grasping the meaning of this realm 
of the inexplicable. Change –regarding our shift of viewpoint to view the unknown, and the legally 
unknown especially –happens in a crucial, quasi- Hegelian momentum. Aristotle accounts for such 
dynamics by showing that amounts do not account for the difference of functions in legal and social 
administrative practices (I, 1, 1252 a7ff).22 It is an error to suppose, Aristotle maintains, that the roles 
of a statesman, of a king, of a household-manager and of a master of slaves are the same, on the 
ground that they differ not in kind but only in point of numbers of persons –that a master of slaves, 
for example, has to do with a few people, a household-manager with more, and a statesman or king 
with more still, as if there were no differences between a large household and a small state. This 
remark, I believe, does not allow us to maintain together with the eminent scholar Jonathan Barnes, 
any im-plicit totalitarianism accepted by Aristotle in view of such a theory regarding the state as being 
compared with a living organism. It is, to borrow from Burke, the notion of order, which underlies the 
diversity of events. This further implies the balance betwe-en order and novelty; and our acceptance 
of determinism without dispensing with the exercise of particular freedoms. As Nussbaum states, 
Aristotle must have been a very balanced character; since his philosophy oscillates between too much 
order and disorder, ambition and abandonment, excess and deficiency, the super-human and the 
merely animal. His methodology is an heuristic one; it is similar to a craftsman’s methodology. 
Nonetheless, I believe that this balance masks his pessimism, as exposed in philosophy and normativity 
especially. However, we may overestimate the normativistic strain, which is to be uncovered painfully 
through his Works. We also may embrace empiricism, which points to certain extraneous factors to 
account for the stages of development and change in human thinking, life and reality in general. We 
would then miss, to borrow from Burke again, the point of the development from intellectual to social 
and even physical developments and the functions ascribed to such corresponding modes of thinking. 
It is this thinking which affords hospitality to the Aristotelian theory of organism. If we neglect this 
idea, then, all the increasing success of natural science, the different talents and temperaments of 
individual thinkers, will only point towards aberrations from empiricism and description, such as the 
bifurcation of nature and the concomitant scepticism. Again, it is the capacity of certain organisms to 
perform a greater range of functions due to the range of equipment which is ascribed to them. This 
range makes the difference between our extending our conceptual equipment from the the known to 
the unknown. We do not mention here the minor difference supplied to us by the bifurcation theories 
of nature and society; not to mention, also, the idealism that embraces totalitarinism and holds 
whatever ideal of truth, legal truth especially, within the bounds of human authority. The Truth is 
annulled.    
3. We may infer from Aristotle that our use of the interpretational range of concepts regarding 
the ideal of justice can neither be refuted nor confirmed. Devotion and non-devotion to this ideal are 
 
21 Cf. Nussbaum, Fragility, 257. 
22 Cf. Nussbaum, Fragility, 262-263; also Burke, Questions of Belief, 34; also his The Philosophy 















































































too far apart to contradict each other. This opening up to change is, of course, voluntarily and 
determines justice as equity, our legal and social world with a greater or lesser ranges of possibilities. 
We may put an end to the reasons for giving reasons ad infinitum (I, 33, 1194 b5-25).23 There is, 
Aristotle states, a just claim for a servant against her/his master, and a son/daughter against her/his 
father. But the just in these cases, he continues, would seem to be homonymous with political justice. 
The justice about which we are inquiring, he adds, is political justice. For this above all consists in 
equality, he states. Citizens thus, he continues, are like partners, and tend to be on a par by nature, 
though they differ in character. But a son against his father or a servant against her/his master would 
not seem to have any just claim at all, any more than Aristotle’s foot or his hand has any just claim 
against him, and in the same way with each of the members. Citizens are supposed, he explains further, 
to be in that position. And in the same way neither has a servant any just claim against her/his master 
for the same reason, he adds. For the servant is a part of her/his master. Or, he explains further, if s/he 
has any just claim against her/him, it is in the way of an economic claim. But this is not what we are in 
search of, he concludes, but political justice; for political justice seems to lie in equality and similarity. 
Here we see the difficulties in ruling with the exercise of this or that particular freedom, since we 
ourselves lacking complete freedom from ignorance, are unable to rule these difficulties out. The only 
hint which Aristotle allows here, is that the search for such a realisation of social and political freedom 
in abstraction from the political conditions under which we can meaningfully perform this exercise, is 
disastrous. Indeed, even if it were possible to eliminate the bases of conflict, according to Nussbaum, 
making all citizens say “mine” and “not-mine” as a single body, we should not do this; because, she 
states, this would mean the destruction of the values proper to the city.  
If, aware of the possibility of error, we state that the progress of social science dep-ends just on the 
fact that all social theory is amenable to tests designed to eliminate the false, then science itself, and 
social science especially could scarcely survive for very long. And, to be fair to Plato, the same holds 
for society. Any exemplary legal sentence would then pursue utility and, as Aristotle fears,24 would 
serve to oppress people and limit their basic liberties. We do not invoke here any psychologically for-
ward-looking theory; on the contrary it is the social that determines such procedures, as Mill 
insinuates. Social factors are prerequisites to these procedures, if they are rationally harnessed. We 
only care to articulate the requirements for the legal procedures, i.e., how we can meaningfully 
articulate legal statements. Returning to Aristotle and to the grounds which he offers for this 
confrontation, we need to refer once more to his Nicomachean Ethics. Once more, we are faced with 
the principle of non-reductionism and of the judge’s devotion to a certain pattern of values, the 
interpretational system of reference. Our commitment to the unknown realm of legal values counts 
more than the ingenious ways of establishing the legal truth or the legal falsity of the statements in 
question. This does not mean that we should accept any and every claim regarding the meaningful 
articulation of these statements. It only means that our entire attempt to establish, identify and 
formulate legal and social facts presupposes that we have already adopted such ranges of 
interpretational concepts, which are without qualification true. This means that our propositions 
realise the ideal of justice, the concrete pattern of legal and social values to which we are committed. 
That is why Aristotle (I, 3, 1094 b25-1095 a5) accepts the sovereignty of judgment over knowledge and 
over legal knowledge especially. Since, Aristotle states, in every case a man judges rightly what s/he 
 
23 Cf. Nussbaum, Fragility, 353. 

















































































understands, and of this only is a good critic, it follows that while in a special field the good critic is a 
specialist, the go-od critic in general is a man with a general education. Returning to Dworkin’s account 
of the interpretational being the normative in legal science, these thoughts are prolonged in the 
following Aristotelian statement, which is of the greatest importance for judges (V, 4, 1132 a20-25). 
When disputes occur, people have recourse to a judge. To do this, he maintains, is to have recourse to 
justice, because the object of the judge is to be a sort of personified justice. Also, Aristotle adds, they 
look for a judge, as an intermediary between them (indeed in some places, e.g. at Larissa or Abydos, 
the judges are called “mediators”), in the belief that if they obtain what is intermediate, they will 
secure what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate, inasmuch as the judge is one. We are lacking in 
value-criteria; this, however, does not entail unreason due to Aristotle’s own legal preference for 
balancing the intellectual and the democratic realization of the ideal of justice. The function of the 
state is compared to the function of the balance of a living organism.  
 
4. We can again see here that the realm of values is indeed inaccessible for the human. It is only 
through certain circumstances that we can meaningfully ask for the realisation of justice –if at all. It is 
our devotion to this realm which makes it possible to meaningfully articulate legal statements 
concerning truth and justice. Justice is personified. And when we speak of ascribing, gaining or fulfilling 
justice, not to speak of other values, we must be humble enough to understand our weakness, our 
incapacity to ever attain them. We can only pursue them and make a claim to them in particular 
circum-stances. We can never adopt a value (V, 6, 1134 b35ff; 1130 a34); This is precisely matched 
with the Aristotelian pessimism about ever attaining values in social, public and institutional life (I, 5, 
1096 a10-17)25. Perhaps we had better examine the universal, Aristotle states, and we had better 
consider critically what is meant by it, although such a course, he admits, is awkward, because friends 
of ours have introduced the theory of Forms. Yet, Aristotle adds, it would be thought better, or rather 
necessary above all for philosophers, to refute in defense of the truth even views to which one is 
attached. And although, he states, both are dear, it is right to give preference to the truth. Now here 
we can trace our incapacity to reach the realm of the universal good in social life and reality in general. 
We can never claim to adopt such values fully; there is always more to us and to social life and reality 
in general. As Nussbaum remarks, our notion of goodness falls short of the unity which is required for 
the establishment of a single science. The term universal good has application to objects to which 
certain logical categories can be assigned with different spatio-temporal locations. The presence of 
each different case corresponds to the object in question. And we have no reason to think that this 
good points to a single common nature uniting all the disparate objects. The subject-matter in legal 
life and reality is good according to our controversial notion of goodness which it represents. If 
Nussbaum’s insight applies to the legal good, we can see how misleading it could be to adopt partial 
idealistic mod-els of truth. This adoption would then lack the vivid element of Aristotle’s ideas on 
change compared to the change which takes place in a living organism. But this rationalism does not 
give rise to empiricism. It is the product of a misunderstanding in the flux of legal life. We also see the 
correspondence between natural and social sciences, as adopted by modern sociologists. That we are 
products of nature (I, 3, 1256 b7-26) does not really inhibit our endeavour to meaningfully attribute 
the interpretational requirements of law to the corresponding procedures, however unsuccessful 
these might be, and however irrationally we may organise institutions, laws and society. Aristotle 
 















































































states that after the evolution of animals, plants exist for their sake; the other animals exist for the 
sake of man. Man, Aristotle states, tames them for the use s/he can make of them, as well as for the 
food they provide; and as for wild animals, most though not all can be used for food or are useful in 
other ways: clothing and instruments can be made out of them. If then, Aristotle concludes, nature 
makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to any purpose, it must be that nature has made all 
of them for the sake of man. This means that it is according to nature that even the art of war –since 
hunting is a part of it, should in a sense be a way of acquiring property. It must thus be used both 
against wild beasts and against such men as are by nature intended to be ruled over but refuse. That 
is the kind of warfare which is by nature just. Our interpretational legal contexts may undermine such 
viewpoints conveyed through legal propositions regarding especially the scientific knowledge of legal 
and social facts. But the interpretational does not belong in the realm of the logically possible. 
 
5. Is the interpretational, then, the normative in Aristotelian texts? The order, however, which 
this normative entails, does not participate in the realm of the possible, of the determined, or of the 
physical, as inferred from the Aristotelian texts. We do not stumble upon our experiences, nor do we 
let them flow over us like a stream. The unknown realm of values is the unlimited resource for the 
unending, uncertain and painful process of attributing meaning to our legal and scientific propositions. 
It is not in our capacity, however, as legal philosophers or as scientists to tell why nature or society 
conforms to a particular order or to any order at all. Whereas we may state general principles of 
interpretation of social legal and scientific facts, we can explain no further.  This is indeed stressed by 
Aristotle, regarding our human vulnerability and incapacity.  Aristotle (VII, 5, 1149 a20-25)26 holds the 
view that incontinence of temper is actually less shameful than incontinence in respect of one’s 
desires. Temper seems, he adds, to pay some attention to reason, but to hear it imperfectly. Aristotle 
offers further examples of eager servants, who go darting off before hearing the end of what is said to 
them, and then mistake their instructions. Dogs, he continues, bark at a mere noise before 
investigating whether it is a friend. In the same way, he continues, temper, owing to the heat and 
impetuosity of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and so hurries to take revenge. For, 
Aristotle continues, when reason or imagination informs somebody that s/he is being insulted or 
slighted, temper infers, as it were, that such a person is to be treated as an enemy, and so instantly 
takes offence. But desire only needs reason or the senses to tell it that a thing is pleasant and sets off 
to enjoy it. Thus, temper, Aristotle continues, is amenable to reason up to a point, but desire is not. So 
desire is more disgraceful. The man who is incontinent of temper, is up to a point swayed by reason, 
but the other is swayed not by reason but by desire. Pakaluk, who comments on these excerpts, states 
that someone who suffers anger correctly reasons that the individuals who committed an injustice 
deserve punishment. S/he is right, Pakaluk continues, to be indignant when s/he realises this. S/he 
makes a kind of implicit mistake, however, if s/he attacks the other, as if s/he is the one who should 
rightly administer the punishment. Her/his mistake is located in the usurpation, not in the indignation. 
This departure from correct conduct, on account of some emotion even less similar to sensual desire, 
is described here in a vague and metaphorical sense. The conditions that define this departure from 
correct conduct have great relevance to millions of people for whom the alternative to a completely 
human life is a life at animal level or no life at all. The conditions for a completely human life have little 
relevance to millions such as those people for whom the alternative to this life is not one of social 
 
















































































knowledge and its tools and values in sociological methodology. We see here a vigorous empiricist 
strain. Is reason then the pimp, or the janitor, or, as Hume would have wished, the slave of passions? 
Indeed, only an overall rational conception of social life and reality in general can guarantee order. And 
this absolutist strain leads us directly to a non-reductionist conception of legal statements regarding 
truth and justice. Legal statements in Aristotle embrace values thus limiting the idea of utility. This 
attempt to rectify past wrongs is alas unsuccessful. Putnam underlines this, arguing that belief in a 
pluralistic ideal is not the same thing as a belief that any idea of how to live is as good as any other. 
We may reject ideals of how to live as wrong, as infantile, as sick, as one-sided. We may at this point 
use Putnam’s idea that the real world depends largely upon our values and our values depend on this 
world. Only within a specific set of circumstances may we ask for the realisation of intellectual values 
and freedom, outside of which the search for them would be non-sensical. It is pointless to search in 
Aristotle for unqualified freedom. Arbitrariness and relativism in the procedures that establish the 
Good Life by institutional means are unacceptable for practical reason.27 Thus offenders and non-
offenders are responsible28 for the realisation of the democratic values that are protected by the afore 
mentioned institutional sanctions. Proportion in equality determines freedom. We can see in Politics, 
1281 b15ff, that all opposition between the general good and the basic liberties can be resolved at the 
moral level that determines equality as such. The basic liberties of those at the bottom of society 
condition the average good in order to promote it, we may infer from Politics, 1253, 1325 a5ff, 1337 
a27ff. These procedures explain Aristotle’s praise in Politics, 1296 a36, for a moderate character of the 
Constitution. All citizens have access to at least some offices, whereby they rule and are ruled by turns. 
The law’s conflicting goals regarding social utility and individual justice will be balanced by social 
stability as determined by equality29. The middle class , those who are neither rich nor poor, are 
sufficiently numerous to hold the balance of power, Aristotle states in Politics, 1268 b25ff, 1292-1297 
a, and thus to avoid relativism and rationalise the institutional means and the penal sanctions which 
are prerequisites for democracy. Any tension between individual justice and social utility is resolved at 
the moral level of the protection of social and political values. The circumstances under which we can 
meaningfully ask for this protection are determined by the penal laws. A concrete example which 
clarifies further these procedures is offered in Politics, 1330 a20. When the Athenian assembly 
deliberates on matters entailing the possibility of a conflict such as a war with a neighbouring city, the 
inhabitants of the frontier zone are excluded from the vote; for they could not vote without their 
particular interests overwhelming their motives, while the decision must be made on general grounds 
only. This again shows, Castoriadis states,30 a conception diametrically opposed to the modern 
mentality of defense and of assertion of interests. We may infer from Athenian Constitution, VIII, 5, 
from Rhetoric, 1369 b17 and from Politics, VII, that basic liberties can be granted only if they protect 
equality.31 A citizen who will not take sides while the city is in civil strife should be deprived of political 
rights. This means that s/he can no longer benefit from the protection that institutions and sanctions 
offer for the safeguarding of democratic values. 
 
 
27 Cf. Castoriadis, Philosophy, 37 ff. 
28 Cf. Magganas and Lazos, Social Values, 105-109; also G. Nikolopoulos, “Criminalisation.” 
29 Cf. Dworkin, Rights, 12-13. 
30 Cf. Castoriadis, Philosophy, 111. 















































































6. Punishment, we may infer from Nicomachean Ethics, 1179 b, 1180 a, is nonsensical implying 
either retribution or social utility.32 The effect of punishment33 either as being a payment for crime (the 
retributive theory of punishment) or as producing exemplary sentences with beneficial consequences 
for society (the social utility theory thereof) cannot be guaranteed in Aristotle as being socially 
efficacious. And all questions of justifying punishment in Aristotle implies the weakness of a valid 
system of penal justice and our futile attempts to ever fully accomplish it. And thus institutional 
punishment must be taken as a prerequisite for democracy; neither as retribution nor as making 
examples.34 This non-realist understanding is connected to major issues of rights necessity and rights 
relinquishing.35 True, Aristotle (1132 a), considers the purpose of judicially imposed penalties to be the 
rectifying of past wrongs. But he also believes that the end can justify the means if the result of 
punishment is social improvement. Deterrence and prevention (1109 b34, 1180 a8, 1104 b17) can 
reduce the crime rate. The tension here between social utility and individual justice is resolved at the 
moral level of the protection of values, namely of freedom as determined by equality. But what kind 
of resolution is this? Unfortunately, however wide the field of doubts facing us, Aristotle’s material 
reductionism is traced simply because it is the content of our experience, a reductionist one. Thus, 
according to to Aristotle’s pessimistic convictions standards of Truth lie in morals,36 i.e., in practical 
 
32 Farsedakis, J. Elements of Criminology, 11 ff. 
33 Cf. Cottingham, “Punishment.” 
34 Giouli, “Is Punishment for Water Rights Speculators in Chile non-Realist?” 
35 Giouli, “Penal Language;” also her “Ancient Greek Tragedy.”  
36 One must refer at this point to a comment of Koraes to Beccaria, an Italian criminologist, 
1738-1794, who links equality to associationism (φιλότης) regarding the meaning of the social 
institution of punishment. Adamantios Koraes, born in Smyrna in 1748 and died in 1833 in 
Paris, a briliant Greek philologist and one of the intellectual instigators of the 1821 Greek 
Revolution, has stressed these procedures. Cf. Beccaria, On Crimes, ix, regarding an 
associationist epistemology behind Beccaria’s utilitarian goal on equality in attributing 
punishment. Koraes, while commenting in the second edition of Crimes, 1823, and having 
translated it into Greek, derives this idea from Aristotle’s use of leniency (ἐπιείκεια) in the 
attribution of punishment. Cf. MS 402 (1). All shortcomings regarding material reductionism 
of the philosophy of power and its epistemology in Aristotle can just possibly be surpassed. 
Cf. Xirogianni, “Koraes,” nn. 12-13; Giouli, Psychoanalysis, 83-106; Giouli, Philosophy of 
Punishment, 75-77. One must refer here to Koraes’ special note on his Preface and translation 
of Aristotle’s Politics, MS. 402 (3), regarding the importance of Herodotus’ “unguided 
(ἀκόλαστος) populace” (3,81,2) for Aristotle’s parallel regarding his philosophy of State. 
Profligacy in Aristotle , however, (literarily in Greek “being unpunished”) has nothing to do 
with the pleasures of learning (Nicomachean Ethics, III, 10, 1117 b28-1118 a1 in Young, 
“Aristotle on Temperance,” 109-110). The body is in no way affected in the pleasures of the 
soul, Aristotle states.  Profligacy thus has to do solely with bodily pleasures. Does this suggest 
Cartesian dualism? Definitely not. Thus, Aristotle continues, the sense with which self-
indulgence is connected is the most widely shared of the senses; and self-indulgence would 
seem to be justly a matter of reproach, because it attaches to us not as Men but as animals. 
To delight in such things, then, Aristotle concludes, and to love them above all others, is 
brutish (b1-4, in “Aristotle on Temperance.”); thus profligacy does not admit reason:  How 
then can one overlook Aristotle’s main line on material reductionism? Is there any remedy in 
this? This is  a focal point of contradiction in Aristotle’s philosophy of reasonable punishment. 
















































































philosophy. We can meaningfully ask for such a realisation of values conditioned (1154 a4) by 
friendship and solidarity. Institutional penal sanctions safeguard democratic values since they serve 
laws the fulfillment of which is stated in Politics, 1155 a4, to be wisdom without desire (1287 a). And 
the basic rule that we should not be subjected to penal sanctions unless we have been proved guilty 
can be seen as a safeguard against the punishment of the innocent. Thus the power of the rulers is 
controlled by the ruled in order that the penal sanctions cannot be used for motives of revenge and 
utility. In well-blended constitutions therefore, we may infer from Politics, 1307 b32, if care should be 
taken to prevent men from committing any breach of the law, above all a minor breach should be 
guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as the habit of spending small 
sums of money often ruins men’s estates: the expense is not noticed because it does not come all at 
once, for the mind is led astray by the repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, if each is 
little, then all are little. This is true, he states, in one way, but in another it is not, for the whole or total 
is not little, but made up of little parts. Can time’s “thread” through one’s lives be “knotted” here –to 
use Kierkegaard’s metaphorical language? Aristotle easily dismisses all argument that can transform 
quantity into quality here; and by insisting on the dichotomy between facts and standards, insists on 
scepticism regarding the use of our thought-models. The authority lies altogether with the world; not 
with our angles and viewpoints regarding specific cases. We are only tenuously connected to a specific 
set of circumstances. Aristotle’s complete objectivity leads him to believe that we cannot ever know 
that punishment  is justified or  is socially efficacious, whether we consider it as a retribution or as 
exemplary.   
7. The fragility of goodness, i.e., human weakness can guarantee and safeguard these procedures 
as prerequisites for democracy. We have examined all such procedures from the idea that the 
effectiveness of punishment is unprovable. We cannot verify nor prove this false. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of revenge and utility as motives re-establishes the institutional character of punishment in 
order to humanise it.37 Punishment is no longer considered to be a symbol of state-oppression and 
becomes a symbol of law.38 The law of ostracism as practised in Politics, III-V, is not oppressive in the 
modern derogatory sense of the term punishment. Punishment as such could provide a technocratic 
approach to problematic situations leading to would-be tyrants. Nonetheless the idea of ostracism 
marks clear disapproval of extreme forms of political strife that would decompose and fragment the 
public space where history is played out according to the values of the period.39 History and politics, 
then, would have become a mask for the assertion of unnecessary rights and of arbitrariness.40 
Punishment becomes a symbol of law which anticipates and can essentially prevent all aggression and 
crime by paedeia, we may infer from Politics, 1310 a14-20, and this without being oppressive, we see 
from Posterior Analytics, 73b, 83b. 
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